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Information search with situation-specific reward functions
Björn Meder∗ Jonathan D. Nelson∗
Abstract
The goal of obtaining information to improve classification accuracy can strongly conflict with the goal of obtaining in-
formation for improving payoffs. Two environments with such a conflict were identified through computer optimization.
Three subsequent experiments investigated people’s search behavior in these environments. Experiments 1 and 2 used
a multiple-cue probabilistic category-learning task to convey environmental probabilities. In a subsequent search task
subjects could query only a single feature before making a classification decision. The crucial manipulation concerned
the search-task reward structure. The payoffs corresponded either to accuracy, with equal rewards associated with the
two categories, or to an asymmetric payoff function, with different rewards associated with each category. In Experiment
1, in which learning-task feedback corresponded to the true category, people later preferentially searched the accuracy-
maximizing feature, whether or not this would improve monetary rewards. In Experiment 2, an asymmetric reward
structure was used during learning. Subjects searched the reward-maximizing feature when asymmetric payoffs were
preserved in the search task. However, if search-task payoffs corresponded to accuracy, subjects preferentially searched
a feature that was suboptimal for reward and accuracy alike. Importantly, this feature would have been most useful, un-
der the learning-task payoff structure. Experiment 3 found that, if words and numbers are used to convey environmental
probabilities, neither reward nor accuracy consistently predicts search. These findings emphasize the necessity of taking
into account people’s goals and search-and-decision processes during learning, thereby challenging current models of
information search.
Keywords: information search, classification, optimal experimental design, payoffs, decisions from experience.
1 Introduction
When diagnosing and treating a patient, when choosing a
job candidate or a mate, and in many other situations, one
must make decisions without having all the relevant infor-
mation. Are there widely applicable strategies for iden-
tifying useful queries? What governs people’s informa-
tion search? In information-acquisition situations where
no particular benefits and costs apply, statistical optimal
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experimental design (OED) models provide one frame-
work for evaluating the value of alternative queries (Fe-
dorov, 1972; Good, 1950; Lindley, 1956; Myung & Pitt,
2009). A variety of experiments suggest that such mod-
els can also provide a reasonable description of human
information-search behavior (reviewed by Nelson 2005,
2008), in situations with no explicit external payoffs.
But in many situations—for instance, when deciding
whether something is safe to eat, whether a suspicious
suitcase contains a bomb, or whether a patient should
be sent to the cardiac care unit—strong asymmetries in
consequences for particular correct or incorrect decisions
apply. These asymmetries have implications for classi-
fication decisions. For instance, a potential cardiac pa-
tient should be sent to the cardiac care unit if the risk of
heart attack is greater than some threshold. The thresh-
old should clearly be less than a 50% chance of heart at-
tack, which would be the threshold for maximizing over-
all classification accuracy.
Are there implications, for information search, of vary-
ing benefits and costs for different kinds of correct and
incorrect decisions? Intuitively, it may seem that the best
strategy is to conduct queries that allow determination of
the true state of nature as accurately as possible, and to
take payoffs into account only in the actual classifica-
tion decision. That intuition is distinctly wrong. As our
theoretical analyses and simulations illustrate, situation-
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specific costs and benefits must be considered when de-
termining which information to acquire (which test to
conduct, which question to ask, which query to make),
and not only when making classification decisions. In
other words, many highly informative tests are useless,
given the applicable situation-specific reward structures.
To what extent does people’s information-search be-
havior appropriately reflect the costs or benefits associ-
ated with different correct or mistaken decisions? We
address this in three experiments, using a probabilistic
multiple-cue category learning and information-search
paradigm. Importantly, we identify and investigate sit-
uations in which the goal of obtaining information that
helps to maximize the number of correct classification
decisions should in principle lead to different search be-
havior than is appropriate to maximize reward, given the
particular environment’s reward structure. (The environ-
mental reward structure consists of the payoffs for each
kind of correct classification decision, and the costs of
each kind of incorrect classification decision.) We exam-
ine whether people’s information-search behavior appro-
priately reflects situation-specific reward structures, or
whether people may use probability gain (accuracy max-
imization, a psychologically plausible goal for informa-
tion search in classification tasks, Baron, 1981, as cited in
Baron, 1985; Nelson, McKenzie, Cottrell, & Sejnowski,
2010) to guide their search decisions, even when it is not
adaptive to do so.
1.1 Overview of paper
We first review research on general-purpose methods for
identifying useful informational queries, and empirical
studies on human information selection in which no ex-
ternal payoffs apply. We then discuss related existing em-
pirical research in psychology, investigating behavior in
situations with different reward structures. This research
shows some of the capabilities and limitations of human
behavior in maximizing payoffs following experience-
based learning, on non-information-search tasks. Some
prior research also deals with information search given
asymmetric rewards, but not in the context of experience-
based learning, and not in contexts in which reward and
accuracy make contradictory predictions.
We then introduce the mathematics that should in prin-
ciple govern classification behavior in environments with
external payoffs, and show how situation-specific payoffs
can be incorporated into models of information search.
Building on these equations, we use computer simula-
tions to identify environments in which it is highly prob-
lematic to use probability gain (i.e., selecting informa-
tion so as to maximize the probability of making a cor-
rect classification decision) to identify queries, if the
goal is to maximize expected reward. We then report
three experiments on human information-search behav-
ior, in those environments. These experiments were de-
signed to identify whether people use probability gain
more broadly than it is adaptive to do so, and what
conditions can facilitate identification of the most use-
ful queries, given situation-specific reward functions. Fi-
nally, we discuss the implications of our findings in re-
lation to Bayesian decision-theoretic models of human
cognition, existing models of the value of information,
and real-world information-search tasks.
2 Models of information search
How can one anticipate the usefulness of possible infor-
mational queries (questions, tests or experiments), before
the answer (query result, experiment result, or test out-
come) is known? In information-acquisition situations
on classification tasks where no particular benefits and
costs apply, optimal experimental design (OED) models1
provide one framework for evaluating the value of al-
ternative queries (Nelson, 2005, 2008; Appendix, Table
A1). Mathematically, these models fall within a frame-
work of expected utility maximization (Savage, 1954),
where utility is defined according to a particular quan-
tification of the value of information. Some OED models
include maximizing improvement in probability of iden-
tifying the correct hypothesis, or category (probability
gain, Baron, 1981/1985), maximizing change in beliefs
(e.g., Kullback-Leibler divergence, Kullback & Leibler,
1951; or impact, Wells & Lindsay, 1980), and minimiz-
ing uncertainty (as measured with Shannon entropy or a
related measure, Shannon, 1948; Lindley, 1956). OED
models can in some cases themselves be exactly imple-
mented by heuristic processes (Navarro & Perfors, 2011;
Nelson, 2005, 2008, 2009). A number of heuristic al-
gorithms, outside the mathematical framework of util-
ity maximization, have also been proposed (Gigerenzer,
Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999; Green & Mehr,
1997; Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011; Martignon,
Katsikopoulos, & Woike, 2008).
Some of these models have been proposed as norma-
tive and/or descriptive models in psychology. For exam-
ple, Baron, Beattie, and Hershey (1988) used probabil-
ity gain as a normative model in a medical test scenario.
1Related terms include epistemic utility and quasi utility (Good,
1950). Note that the idea with “optimal” experimental design models is
not that they are globally optimal for sequential search. Indeed, compu-
tational constraints usually require planning only a limited number of
steps into the future. Nor are OED models intended to optimize known
external constraints. Rather, OED models are a statistical attempt to
elucidate reasonable bases for selecting experiments, queries, or tests
when external utilities do not apply or are not specifically known. This
might be the case on perceptual or other categorization tasks, and sci-
entific inference tasks. Various names of particular models have been
used. We follow Nelson’s (2005, 2008) nomenclature.
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Crupi, Tentori, and Lombardi (2009) used probability
gain in an analysis of the pseudo-diagnosticity paradigm.
Oaksford and Chater (1994, 1996) used information gain
to analyze Wason’s (1966, 1968) selection task. Klayman
and Ha (1987) used impact in their research on hypothe-
sis testing (Klayman, 1987, also used information gain).
Most of these studies focused on tasks where no particu-
lar benefits and costs apply. (Baron & Hershey’s, 1988,
medical diagnosis task, and Oaksford & Chater’s, 1994,
model of deontic versions of Wason’s selection task, are
notable exceptions.) This research has shown that infor-
mation search that may look irrational from the view-
point of classical deductive logic may make sense from
the perspective of adaptively seeking information to fa-
cilitate probabilistic inductive inference (Chater & Oaks-
ford, 2008; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Chater,
2007). Other work (Myung & Pitt, 2009; Cavagnaro,
Myung, Pitt, & Kujala, 2010) shows how OED princi-
ples can be used to automatically design experiments to
investigate different aspects of human cognition and dis-
criminate between competing cognitive models (e.g., the
shape of memory decay curves).
Which model best describes human intuition about the
usefulness of possible informational queries, on classi-
fication tasks where no particular external payoffs ap-
ply? Nelson et al. (2010) used an experience-based cat-
egory learning paradigm to pit alternate models against
each other, in several experiments. Probability gain best
described human information search behavior when en-
vironmental probabilities were learned through experi-
ence and no particular costs or benefits for different types
of decisions applied. Subjects preferentially viewed the
higher-probability gain feature in all the environments
studied by Nelson et al., even in cases when all the other
OED models (Appendix, Table A1) preferred a different
query.
3 Prior research
Previous research does not address information search in
the context of asymmetric reward functions, where the
two goals of obtaining information for improving classifi-
cation accuracy, and maximizing reward, contradict each
other. Previous research addresses related issues, how-
ever. These issues include:
1. the circumstances under which classifications of
stimuli can adapt to asymmetric payoff structures,
in non-search tasks;
2. people’s ability in rapid motor movement tasks,
which do not involve information acquisition, to
spontaneously adapt to asymmetric payoff struc-
tures; and
3. the factors driving people’s choices among queries,
in environments with asymmetric payoffs, but in
which the alternate queries are objectively equally
useful.
Our experiments bring together these research areas in
novel ways.
3.1 Perceptual categorization, asymmetric
rewards, and signal detection theory
Several studies on perceptual categorization have used a
signal-detection-theory framework to examine how peo-
ple’s decision criteria vary as a function of the costs and
benefits associated with different categorization decisions
(Maddox, 2002; Maddox & Bohil, 1998, 2003; Maddox
& Dodd, 2001; von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1982). Typ-
ically, these categorization experiments present subjects
with stimuli (e.g., lines of varying length), randomly sam-
pled from two overlapping category distributions. The
task of the subject is to categorize a given stimulus (e.g.,
as “short” vs. “long”) in a way that maximizes accuracy
or expected reward.
Maddox and Bohil (1998, 2001; see also Maddox,
2002; Maddox & Dodd, 2001) examined how people’s
categorization decisions vary as function of asymmetric
payoffs. For example, if correct Category x responses
are rewarded twice as highly as correct Category y re-
sponses, the expected value of a Category x response is
higher than the expected value of a Category y response
whenever P(Category x | stimulus) > 1/3. (The section on
“Decision bounds in binary classification tasks,” below,
provides a formal treatment.) By contrast, to maximize
accuracy, one must always choose the more likely cate-
gory, meaning to predict x whenever P(Category x | stim-
ulus) > 1/2. To maximize long-run expected reward, one
must sometimes choose the less likely category, which
necessarily leads to a higher number of incorrect classifi-
cation decisions than if always choosing the more likely
category. Thus, asymmetrically rewarded classification
decisions induce a conflict between accuracy and reward.
Do people adopt decision criteria so as to maximize
reward, in classification tasks? Typically, people shift
their decision criterion away from 50% in the appropri-
ate direction, but not as much as would be optimal from
the perspective of expected reward. To account for these
and related findings, Maddox and Bohil (1998) intro-
duced the COmpetition Between Reward and Accuracy
(COBRA) hypothesis. Since under asymmetric payoffs
the reward- and accuracy-maximizing decision bounds
conflict, the resulting criterion placement is suboptimal
(for an overview, see Maddox, 2002). Thus, even given
experience-based learning of the overlapping category
distributions, when reward and accuracy conflict, peo-
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 7, No. 2, March 2012 Information search and payoffs 122
ple’s categorization decisions can fail to follow a reward-
maximizing strategy. Note, however, that this line of re-
search (and the COBRA model) is not concerned with
information search, but rather with classification learning
based on full stimulus information.
3.2 Rapid motor movements under uncer-
tainty and spontaneous reward maxi-
mization
Another research program that uses experience-based
learning to convey probabilistic information, and stud-
ies people’s ability to spontaneously behave appropriately
in the context of situation-specific reward structures, in-
volves rapid motor movement tasks. Trommershäuser,
Maloney, and Landy (2003a,b) introduced tasks that in-
volved rapid pointing to a touch screen, with a payoff for
hitting a reward region (e.g., a green circle), and a penalty
for hitting a penalty region (e.g., a red circle). Because of
the small size and close spatial (or overlapping) location
of the reward and penalty regions, and the motor uncer-
tainty in the rapid movement, it is generally not optimal
to aim at the center of the reward region. Rather, the
intended reach location should be appropriately shifted
(according to the motor uncertainty in the rapid reaching
movement), to maximize the expected payoff, aggregat-
ing the expected reward (amount times probability) from
the hit region, minus the expected penalty (amount times
probability) from the penalty region(s).
These motor tasks are mathematically equivalent to
more traditional decision making under risk tasks stud-
ied in psychology (e.g., choices between gambles). Each
pointing trial is the choice of a gamble, defined by the
intended pointing location. The possible outcomes of
a motor action (gamble) are determined by the proba-
bility, given the motor uncertainty, of actually touching
each particular region (each reward, penalty, or overlap
region) on the screen, and that region’s associated pay-
offs. Trommershäuser et al. (2003a,b) found that people
were close to optimal (typically earning 95+% of the the-
oretical maximum returns) in movement tasks, with mon-
etary reward. In view of other psychological research on
decision making under uncertainty, and the fact that the
relevant probabilities were never explicitly conveyed to
subjects, this is remarkable (Trommershäuser, Maloney,
& Landy, 2008).
Note also that subjects’ capacity to apply a reward-
maximizing strategy did not require new learning expe-
riences, or gradually shifting behavior, after the payoff
scheme was introduced. Prior to the actual decision-
making phase, in which the payoff scheme was imposed,
subjects underwent a motor-task training phase, in which
they internalized motor uncertainty without explicit pay-
offs for correct or incorrect pointing movements. In
the motor training phase, subjects had to reach quickly,
and could learn how accurate they are in hitting a par-
ticular target location in the available time. After this
experience-based learning of motor uncertainty, the re-
ward function was introduced. At this point, subjects
immediately adapted their movements to approximately
maximize reward. These findings suggest that when
probabilistic information (the motor uncertainty of the
reach destination under time pressure) is properly inter-
nalized, people are able to adapt their behavior to maxi-
mize reward.
What are the limits to this kind of reward-maximizing
behavior? Wu, Trommershäuser, Maloney, and Landy
(2005) noted that in Trommershäuser et al.’s (2003a,
2003b) tasks, the optimal reach destination was always
somewhere along a single imaginary line, about which
the reward and penalty regions were symmetric. If a sub-
ject noticed and correctly intuited this symmetry, they
could reduce the decision space from two dimensions to
a single continuous dimension. (Wu et al. called this the
symmetry-axis heuristic). Wu et al. (2005) considered a
slightly more complex scenario, in which there were two
penalty regions, which differed in their severity. In this
scenario, the optimal movement endpoint goal was not on
the imaginary symmetry line. Rather, the optimal move-
ment goal was slightly within the lesser-penalty region, in
a location that overlaps with the reward region. Although
performance was high, the distributions of most subjects’
reaches were shifted significantly away from the optimal
locations, suggesting that this task is more difficult than
the earlier maximum expected gain tasks.
To summarize, Trommershäuser and colleagues’ re-
search suggests that, following experience-based learn-
ing to internalize uncertainty in motor movement tasks,
people have a remarkable, but not perfect, ability to take
arbitrary payoff functions into account, without requiring
new learning experiences. The conditions for optimality
in the motor movement plans—namely, why Trommer-
shäuser et al. (2003a,b) saw it, yet Wu et al (2005) did
not—are not fully clear.
3.3 Information search under asymmetric
reward functions
Whereas standard classification tasks require people to
categorize items based on the full stimulus information,
search tasks require people to consider which query (test,
question, experiment) is most useful to achieve a cer-
tain goal (such as maximizing reward or accuracy) be-
fore making a classification decision. For each possible
test outcome (e.g., for a positive or negative medical test
result), such a task requires estimating its marginal prob-
ability, its implications (i.e., posterior probability that a
person does or does not have the disease, given a par-
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ticular test result), and its usefulness with respect to the
agent’s goals. For instance, it may be more important to
correctly identify people who have a disease than those
who do not have the disease, or vice versa, or to maxi-
mize overall classification accuracy.
Baron and Hershey’s (1988) study of information ac-
quisition included some problems in which the choice
was whether or not to conduct a medical test, and other
problems in which the choice was which of two tests to
conduct. In each particular scenario, subjects were given
information on the probability of a disease, and one or
two tests. The information on each test was presented as
the test’s true positive rate (the probability of a positive
test result in a patient who has the disease), and the false
positive rate (the probability of a positive test result in a
patient who does not have the disease). There were no
explicit payoffs for correct diagnoses. The reward struc-
ture was described in terms of the cost (harm) of treat-
ing a person who does not have the disease, and the cost
(neglect) of failing to treat a person who does have the
disease. Both symmetric and asymmetric cost structures
were used. In the symmetric cost structure, failing to treat
a person with the disease was equally problematic as un-
necessarily treating a healthy person. In the asymmetric
cost structure, one of the kinds of errors had a greater
cost, which was specified, than the other kind of error.
In some scenarios (Experiment 1, Cases 5–11), the
task was to choose between two tests. The idea was
to try to identify the cues that people use to select use-
ful tests. Baron and Hershey found that subjects were
often sensitive to normatively relevant variables, includ-
ing prior probabilities of the disease, the difference be-
tween true and false positive rate (which corresponds to
a test’s impact; Nelson, 2005, 2009), and the applicable
cost structure. Baron and Hershey also found that sub-
jects use heuristic strategies, for instance by choosing a
test that, relative to a given cost structure, minimizes the
most harmful kind of errors.
However, because the tests were objectively equally
useful (i.e., had the same utility given the applicable cost
structure), subjects’ preferences do not directly show how
sensitive people are to the relative objective usefulness of
different tests. In about half of the cases, subjects did not
have a statistically reliable preference for one test over
the other. In other cases, subjects did have a preference
between the tests. Why? Some subjects’ written justifica-
tions indicated that they had at least approximately calcu-
lated the relevant probabilities and utilities, and realized
that the tests were roughly equally useful. (This does not
explain why subjects preferred particular tests, in other
scenarios.) Another possibility is that people used infor-
mational strategies, consistent with OED models, to pick
queries. To address this, we re-analyzed these scenarios.
However, no OED models consistently predicted behav-
ior (see Appendix, Table A2).
Still another possibility is that subjects have difficul-
ties understanding and utilizing probabilistic information
when it is presented with words and numbers, in this type
of task. Traditional words-and-numbers formats are not
very meaningful for inductive inferences (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Krauss, Mar-
tignon, & Hoffrage, 1999), and lead to less-consistent
search behavior than experience-based learning (Nelson
et al., 2010). Baron and Hershey found evidence that
subjects may have used particular heuristic strategies that
could be applied given the words-and-numbers format of
the probability and cost (reward structure) information.
4 Aims of this paper
Previous research on classification decisions and on rapid
movement tasks under asymmetric rewards gives a com-
plicated picture regarding the circumstances under which
people’s behavior, following experience-based learning,
can respond appropriately to externally imposed payoff
structures. Moreover, this research does not examine in-
formation search. Although Baron and Hershey (1988)
did study information acquisition under asymmetric pay-
off structures, they did not use experience-based learn-
ing of environmental probabilities, and they did not study
circumstances under which the goal of gathering infor-
mation to improve accuracy contradicts the goal of max-
imizing some external payoff function. Thus, it is hard
to predict from the literature whether people will be able
to identify the most useful tests, after learning environ-
mental probabilities through experience, when situation-
specific payoffs apply. The present paper has twin goals:
1. theoretically identify circumstances under which
it is important to take situation-specific payoff
schemes into account when searching for informa-
tion, and
2. empirically address the circumstances under which
people can take situation-specific payoffs into ac-
count when searching for information.
Our theoretical analyses integrate ideas from optimal
experimental design, statistical decision theory, and sig-
nal detection theory. We use computational search tech-
niques to identify environments in which searching with
the goal to obtain the most reward is maximally incom-
patible with the goal of making accurate classification de-
cisions. Empirically, we use experience-based learning
and actual information-search tasks to address whether
human subjects’ information-search behavior can appro-
priately make use of situation-specific (symmetric and
asymmetric) reward structures. We conduct these exper-
iments in the environments identified through our com-
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Figure 1: Statistical environments to differentiate usefulness of features A and R under symmetric vs. asymmetric
reward functions. In each environment, there are four stimuli (‘plankton’), constructed by combining two binary
features, A (“eye”) and R (“claw”). The numbers above the items indicate their frequencies; the numbers below
indicate the probability of belonging to Category x or y, respectively. The table at right provides detailed information
on the two environments.
Environment 1
3.7% 37.7% 8.6% 49.9%
a1 r1 a1 r2 a2 r1 a2 r2
0% 100% 65.3% 34.7% 0% 100% 38.8% 61.2%
Cat. x Cat. y Cat. x Cat. y Cat. x Cat. y Cat. x Cat. y
Environment 2
22.5% 33.7% 5.6% 38.1%
a1 r1 a1 r2 a2 r1 a2 r2
0% 100% 15% 85% 0% 100% 81.2% 18.8%
Cat. x Cat. y Cat. x Cat. y Cat. x Cat. y Cat. x Cat. y
Probabilities
Env. 1 Env. 2
Priors:
P (x) 0.440 0.360
P (y) 0.560 0.640
Likelihoods:
P (a1 r1|x) 0.000 0.000
P (a1 r2|x) 0.560 0.140
P (a2 r1|x) 0.000 0.000
P (a2 r2|x) 0.440 0.860
P (a1 r1|y) 0.066 0.352
P (a1 r2|y) 0.234 0.448
P (a2 r1|y) 0.154 0.088
P (a2 r2|y) 0.546 0.112
Frequencies:
P (a1 r1) 0.037 0.225
P (a1 r2) 0.377 0.337
P (a2 r1) 0.086 0.056
P (a2 r2) 0.499 0.381
Posteriors:
P (x|a1 r1) 0.000 0.000
P (x|a1 r2) 0.653 0.150
P (x|a2 r1) 0.000 0.000
P (x|a2 r2) 0.388 0.812
puter simulations, in which the goals of obtaining infor-
mation to be accurate, and obtaining information for re-
ward, maximally conflict.
Experiments 1 and 2 each consist of two tasks: a
classification-learning task and a search task. In the learn-
ing task, both feature values of the stimuli were visible in
every trial. The learning-task procedure was very sim-
ilar to that of Nelson et al. (2010), and other multiple-
cue probabilistic category learning tasks (e.g., Knowlton,
Squire, & Gluck, 1994; Kruschke & Johansen, 1999). It
was also similar to perceptual categorization classifica-
tion tasks in the signal detection theory paradigm (e.g.,
Maddox, 2002). Figure 1 illustrates the category-learning
task at a more conceptual level; Figure 4 illustrates a sam-
ple trial from the category-learning task. The goal of the
learning task was to help subjects internalize environmen-
tal probabilities. Stimuli consisted of two dichotomous
features: A (e.g., the eye feature), which can take values
a1 and a2, and R (e.g., the claw feature), which can take
values r1 and r2. Subjects’ task was to classify stimuli as
Category x or Category y, as a function of which stimulus
was shown (a1r1, a1r2, a2r1, or a2r2).
Our research question concerned behavior in the sub-
sequent search task. In this task, subjects could view only
a single feature (Feature A or Feature R), before classify-
ing stimuli. Figure 2 illustrates the decision problem that
the search task presents, at a conceptual level. Once a
feature is chosen to view, the specific value that it takes
is revealed (Feature A can take values a1 or a2; Feature R
can take values r1 or r2), according to the environmental
probabilities. Based on this information, subjects had to
classify the item as Category x or y.
The crucial manipulation concerned the monetary pay-
offs for correct classification decisions in the search task:
in the symmetric payoffs condition, each type of correct
classification paid the same amount of money (2C for any
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correct classification). In this case, maximizing accuracy
will also maximize rewards, and Feature A is most use-
ful. In the asymmetric payoffs condition, correct classifi-
cations of one category received a higher payoff than cor-
rect classifications of the other category (e.g., 2C for cor-
rect Category x classifications vs. 0.2C for correct Cat-
egory y classifications). In this case, maximizing over-
all classification accuracy would not maximize rewards,
and Feature R is more useful. This manipulation was de-
signed to mimic the asymmetric rewards inherent in real-
world scenarios, such as medical screening, in which it is
more important to correctly identify patients who have a
disease than those who do not have the disease.
Mathematically, the search task is very different from
the learning task, as it requires people to determine which
of the two features (A vs. R) would be most useful, rela-
tive to their goals (e.g., the applicable payoff function or
an intrinsic goal, such as maximizing accuracy), before
seeing the specific feature value or making a classifica-
tion decision. Choosing a feature to view requires an-
ticipating the usefulness of the possible outcomes of the
search (e.g., usefulness of a1 vs. a2, in the case of Fea-
ture A), and aggregating the usefulness of each possible
feature value according to its probability, in order to de-
termine the aggregate usefulness of the feature. (Raiffa
and Schlaifer, 1961, would call this a preposterior analy-
sis.) Importantly, the usefulness of the individual feature
states depends on the goal, such as maximizing accuracy
or reward.
Note that the classification part of the search task
is mathematically also very different from that of the
learning task. For example, a subject may decide to
search Feature A, and observe that it takes the value
a1. Given this single piece of information, the sub-
ject has to estimate the probability of the categories,
e.g., P(Category x | a1). However, this information
may not have been learned, because in the learning
task classifications were made based on full information
about both feature states, e.g., P(Category x | a1r1) and
P(Category x | a1r2). Thus, to estimate P(Category x | a1),
the subject has to remember P(Category x | a1r1) and
P(Category x | a1r2), and then to average those two num-
bers according to the relative frequency of the a1r1 and
a1r2 configurations.
4.1 Hypotheses
The environments used in our experiments entailed a con-
flict between the goals of improving accuracy and re-
ward, when searching under asymmetric reward schemes:
whereas Feature A improves overall classification accu-
racy, Feature R improves expected reward. The question
was which feature people would prefer to view, accord-
ing to the way they learned the environmental probabil-
ities and the actual (symmetric vs. asymmetric) search-
task payoff structure.
Research on motor movement tasks suggests that if
people meaningfully assimilate environmental probabil-
ities, their performance might indeed approximate a
reward-maximizing strategy, consistent with ideas from
Bayesian decision theory. Thus, they should search Fea-
ture A under symmetric rewards (as in this case maximiz-
ing accuracy will also maximize rewards), but Feature R
when searching under asymmetric rewards.
On the other hand, studies on experience-based infor-
mation search (Nelson et al., 2010) show that maximiz-
ing accuracy (i.e., searching for information that helps
to improve classification accuracy) best describes peo-
ple’s search behavior when no explicit external rewards
are provided. Similarly, studies on perceptual categoriza-
tion (which do not address information search) show that
people have a general preference for accuracy, making it
difficult to apply a reward-maximizing strategy in pure
classification tasks. These findings lend support to the
prediction that people may also have a preference for ac-
curacy in information-search tasks, even when this may
be suboptimal for maximizing rewards. On this view,
people may preferentially search Feature A, even when
searching under asymmetric payoffs.
Finally, it may be that people generally have difficulty
identifying which informational query is most useful to
achieve their goals when accuracy and reward conflict,
even following experience-based learning of environmen-
tal probabilities. In this case, people might have no par-
ticular preference for Feature A vs. R, regardless of the
applicable reward function.
In the following section, we briefly introduce the math-
ematics that should govern behavior (for an agent who
wishes to maximize rewards, or utility) in two-way clas-
sification tasks with situation-specific rewards. Impor-
tantly, these equations also form the foundation of calcu-
lation of questions’ usefulness in the context of informa-
tion search, given asymmetric payoff structures. Subse-
quently, we describe our simulation experiments to iden-
tify environments to differentiate probability gain from
situation-specific utilities, and behavioral experiments to
identify what tests people select when reward and accu-
racy conflict.
5 Decision bounds in binary classi-
fication tasks
Consider a task in which stimuli must be designated as
Category x or Category y. Given a particular reward func-
tion, including the rewards associated with correct x and
y classifications, and the costs associated with incorrect x
and y classifications, it is possible to determine for each
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Figure 2: Information-search task illustrated. First one has to decide which feature to view (A or R, here “eye” and
“claw” of plankton stimuli, respectively). The numbers show how likely one is to encounter a particular feature value,
as well as the posterior probabilities of the two categories, given the feature value. Below the tree, the utility gain
(Equation 5) of features (A, R) and feature values (a1, a2, r1, r2) is shown, for symmetric and asymmetric rewards.
The height of the bars indicates the amount of utility gain: the width represents the frequency of occurrence. For
example, in Environment 1, under the symmetric reward function, feature r1 entails a high utility gain (0.440), but
the probability of encountering this feature value is low (0.123). The tables provide detailed information on the two
environments.
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possible value of P(Category x | stimulus) whether desig-
nating an item as Category x or y has a higher expected
reward (utility, or payoff). We refer to an environmental
payoff structure in the form [k l m n] as follows (Figure
3a):
• k is the payoff for correct classification of a Category
x stimulus (“predict x” when the true category is x);
• l is the payoff for correct classification of a Category
y stimulus (“predict y” when the true category is y);
• m is the cost of erroneously categorizing a Category
y stimulus as Category x (“predict x” when the true
category is y);
• n is the cost of erroneously categorizing a Category
x stimulus as Category y (“predict y” when the true
category is x).
Given a particular reward structure2, the reward-
maximizing decision bound, which we call cx, corre-
sponds to the point of indifference, i.e., the probability
of a stimulus belonging to Category x, P(x), for which
both possible categorization decisions (“predict Category
x” and “predict Category y”) have equal expected value
(von Winterfeld & Edwards, 1982). The probability of
Category x, P(x), for which both categorization choices
have the same expected reward is given by solving
kP (x)−m(1− P (x)) = l(1− P (x)) − n(P (x)) (1)
for P(x). The left side of the equation gives the expected
value of classifying the stimulus as belonging to Category
x, and the right side of the equation gives the expected
value of classifying the stimulus as belonging to Category
y. This implies that the indifference point, or decision
criterion cx, is given by
P (x) = cx =
l + m
k + l + m + n
(2)
2Our terms can be related to signal detection theory. If Category x
is signal, and Category y is noise, then k is the payoff for a hit, l is the
payoff for a correct rejection, m is the cost of a false positive, and n is
the cost of a false negative (Figure 3). Our terms can also be related to
the medical diagnosis scenarios used by Baron and Hershey (1988). If
Category x is disease, and Category y is healthy, then k is the payoff for
correctly treating a person with the disease, l is the payoff for correctly
not treating a person without the disease, m is the cost (harm) from treat-
ing a person who does not have the disease, and n is the cost (neglect)
from failing to treat a person with the disease. The payoff structures we
use (with positive payoffs for correct categorizations but no penalties
for mistakes), and the payoff structures Baron and Hershey (1988) used
(with penalties for mistakes but no rewards for correct diagnoses) can
be easily equated. A [2 1 0 0] payoff structure, and a [0 0 1 2] pay-
off structure each lead to cx=1/3; a [10 1 0 0] and a [0 0 1 10] payoff
structure each lead to cx =1/11, etc.
If k – m = l – n, then the decision bound cx=1/2;
we term this a symmetric reward function (or pay-
off structure). If cx=1/2, selecting the more proba-
ble category maximizes both reward and accuracy (to-
tal number of correct classifications). Examples include
[k l m n]=[1 1 0 0] (Figure 3b), a symmetric payoff struc-
ture under which correct classifications of either category
receive one unit payoff, and there are no costs for mak-
ing erroneous classification decisions, but also the payoff
structure [5 10 3 8], which may not look symmetric on
first glance.
An asymmetric reward function applies when cx 6=1/2.
For example, [k l m n] = [10 1 0 0] refers to a reward
scheme according to which correct Category x decisions
are rewarded ten times as highly as correct Category y
decisions, and there are no costs for erroneous decisions
(Figure 3d). Plugging these values into Equation 2 yields
cx=1/11, meaning that one should predict Category x if
P(x) > 9%, and predict y otherwise.
Figure 3 (right hand side) exemplifies the situations
graphically. For each value of P(Category x | stimulus)
one can determine the action (“predict x” vs. “predict y”)
that has the higher expected value. The decision bound
cx is given by the intersection of the two reward functions
for the “predict x” and “predict y” responses.
6 Simulation experiment: Utility
gain vs. probability gain
Are there implications of symmetric vs. asymmetric re-
ward structures for information search, when one or more
properties in the environment can be queried, before mak-
ing a classification decision? How can one quantify
the usefulness of alternative queries, such as when de-
ciding whether to look at Feature A (“eye”) vs. Feature
R (“claw”) in Figure 2?
In this section we introduce probability gain, which is
a psychologically plausible optimal experimental design
(epistemic utility) method for selecting queries (Baron,
1985; Nelson et al., 2010). We also introduce utility
gain, which uses the situation-specific utility structure to
identify the most useful query. Finally, we use computer
search techniques to identify environments in which the
asymmetric reward structure strongly suggests that one
query (e.g., looking at Feature R) is most useful, but prob-
ability gain strongly prefers a different query (e.g., look-
ing at Feature A). We will subsequently use those envi-
ronments in three experiments to explore whether human
search can adapt to environment-specific reward struc-
tures.
Let F denote a feature (a random variable) before its
specific state is known. The possible states of the feature
F are f 1, f 2, . . . , f m. The expected usefulness (utility)
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Figure 3: Payoff functions in a binary classification task (Category x vs. Category y)
a) General case: The reward-
maximizing decision
bound cx is given by
(l + m) / (k + l + m + n). If
P(Category x | stimulus) > cx
one should predict Category
x, if P(Category x |stimulus)
< cx one should predict
Category y.
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b) Symmetric payoffs: If
k + m = l + n, then the deci-
sion bound cx = 1/2, meaning
that one should always select
the more likely category, to
maximize rewards. This is
the implicit reward function
when the goal is to maximize
accuracy.
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c) Moderately asymmetric pay-
offs: Correct Category x clas-
sifications are rewarded twice
as much as correct Category y
classifications; cx = 1/3.
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d) Strongly asymmetric payoffs:
Correct Category x classifica-
tions are rewarded ten times
as much as correct Category y
classifications; cx = 1/11.
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of Feature F can be defined as the average of the useful-
ness of the possible states of F, u( fj), weighted by their
probability (Savage, 1954):
eu(F ) =
m∑
j=1
P (fj)u(fj) (3)
Different models have been suggested to calculate the
usefulness of choosing to view a feature, before the par-
ticular feature state is known. We focus on probability
gain (PG; Baron, 1985), which appears to best capture
people’s intuitions about the usefulness of different fea-
tures in classification tasks when environmental probabil-
ities are learned through experience (Nelson et al., 2010).
Probability gain quantifies the expected utility of a feature
query (a test question) as the probability of correctly clas-
sifying a stimulus after the state fj of Feature F is known,
minus the probability of making a correct decision with-
out asking the question:
eupg(F ) =
m∑
j=1
P (fj) max
i
(P (ci|fj))−max
i
(P (ci)) (4)
where P(ci| fj) denotes the posterior probability of cate-
gory ci given that feature fj has been observed, and P(ci) is
the prior probability of category ci. As the model assumes
selection of the most probable hypothesis, it is only con-
cerned with the maximum of the prior and posterior dis-
tributions. Using this measure to quantify the usefulness
of a datum and as basis for information search will maxi-
mize accuracy (i.e., number of correct classifications); the
“currency” of this model is the expected improvement in
correct classifications. Thus, a fixed decision bound of
cx=1/2 is built in to this model.3
But what if different types of correct classification de-
cisions are not equally rewarded? In this case we may
3To illustrate, consider Environment 1 in Figure 2. Without query-
ing Feature A or R, one should assign an item to Category y, which
has the higher base rate (56%) (see table in Figure 2). On average one
would achieve 56% classification accuracy. Imagine we can view just
one feature, and we decide to look at Feature A. We will observe a1
with 41.44% probability and a2 with 58.56% probability. If we ob-
serve a1, we should classify the items as Category x, achieving 59.45%
accuracy. If we observe a2, we should assign the stimulus to Cate-
gory y, and will be correct on 66.94% of the cases. Weighing these
outcomes by the frequencies of each respective feature value yields an
expected accuracy of 0.4144 × 0.5945 + 0.5856 × 0.6694 = 0.6384.
Thus, looking at A will improve our classification accuracy from 56%
to 63.84%, on average; the probability gain of this feature is 0.0784.
Now consider Feature R. If we search this feature, we will observe r1
with 12.32% probability and r2 with 87.68% probability. If r1 is ob-
served, we know that the stimulus definitely belongs to Category y. If
we encounter r2, x is slightly more likely (50.18%). The expected ac-
curacy is 0.1232 × 1 + 0.8768 × 0.5018 = 0.5632. Thus the probability
gain of Feature R is effectively zero, because querying Feature R does
not meaningfully improve accuracy, versus the 56% accuracy that can
be achieved without looking at either feature.
generalize the probability gain model to the utility gain
model, which defines a datum’s usefulness as the extent
to which it increases the expected utility of a classifica-
tion decision (Savage, 1954). The expected utility of a
feature query is the utility associated with classifying a
stimulus after the state of Feature F is known, minus the
utility of making a decision without searching for infor-
mation:
euug(F ) =
m∑
j=1
P (fj) max
i
(u(predict ci|fj))−
max
i
(u(predict ci)) (5)
where in the two-category case “predict c1” corresponds
to “predict x” and “predict c2” corresponds to “predict y”,
respectively (see Equation 1).
Conceptually, the utility gain model is similar to the
probability gain model, except that utility gain is based
on the maxima of the prior and posterior utility distri-
bution, taking into account the costs and benefits of dif-
ferent types of classification decisions. The “currency“
of this model is improvement in expected utility, and
the implicitly entailed decision bound maximizes util-
ity (reward). Under a symmetric reward function, the
utility gain model reduces to the probability gain model
(i.e., both models operate with the same decision criterion
cx=1/2).4
4To illustrate, consider again Environment 1 (Figure 2), but now
assume that correct Category x classifications pay two units reward,
whereas correct Category y decision pay one unit reward (i.e., a
[2 1 0 0] reward function applies). Without querying a feature, the
expected reward when classifying an item as Category x (which is
the less likely, but higher rewarded category) is higher than Cate-
gory y (0.44 × 2 = 0.88 vs. 0.56 × 1 = 0.56). If looking at Feature
A, one will observe a1 with 41.44% probability and a2 with 58.56%
probability. If we observe a1, then the probability of Category x is
59.45%, so we should classify the items as Category x, which yields
0.5945 × 2 = 1.1891 units of reward. If we observe a2, the prob-
ability of Category y is 66.94% (which is greater than the thresh-
old of 2/3), so we should assign the stimulus to Category y, yield-
ing 0.6694 × 1 = 0.6694 units of reward. Thus, the expected value
of Feature A is 0.4144 × 1.1891 + 0.5856 × 0.6694 = 0.8848, ef-
fectively unchanged from the 0.88 units of utility that can be ob-
tained without looking at either feature. Thus, utility gain of Fea-
ture A (0.0048) is effectively zero. Now consider Feature R. We
will observe r1 with 12.32% probability and r2 with 87.68% prob-
ability. If r1 is observed, we know that the stimulus definitely be-
longs to Category y, yielding one unit reward. If we encounter r2,
both categories are equally likely (50.18% vs. 49.82%), but since x is
higher rewarded, the item should be assigned to this category, yielding
0.5018 × 2 = 1.0037 units reward. The overall expected reward of Fea-
ture R is 0.1232 × 1 + 0.8768 × 1.0037 = 1.0032. Thus, the utility gain
expected from querying R is 1.0032 – 0.88 = 0.1232 units reward.
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6.1 Environments for differentiating prob-
ability gain and utility gain
Would using the utility gain model lead to making dif-
ferent queries than using probability gain, when search-
ing for information under asymmetric payoffs? We
used computer simulations to search for environments
in which the goals of accuracy and reward make maxi-
mally contradictory claims about which of two features
would be most useful to view. We considered a moder-
ately asymmetric [2 1 0 0] payoff structure, as well as a
strongly asymmetric [10 1 0 0] payoff structure, in sep-
arate optimization procedures. Given these payoff func-
tions we searched in environments with two mutually ex-
clusive categories, Category x and Category y, and two
features: A, which can take values a1 and a2, and R,
which can take values r1 and r2. For instance, for the
[2 1 0 0] reward structure, we searched for values of P(x),
P(a1|x), P(a1|y), P(r1|x), and P(r1|y), such that the prob-
ability gain of Feature A is much higher than that of Fea-
ture R, but the utility gain (relative to the [2 1 0 0] payoff
structure) of Feature R is much higher than that of Fea-
ture A.5 A further constraint was that both features would
be needed in order to achieve the maximum possible ac-
curacy in classifying stimuli as Category x vs. Category
y. This constraint was included to insure that both fea-
tures would be learned, in the learning task of our exper-
iments. The features were class-conditionally indepen-
dent (i.e., the state of Feature A was independent of the
state of Feature R, and vice versa, conditional on the true
category).
Figure 1 outlines the environments found by these op-
timizations. The two trees illustrate the frequency of
the different stimulus configurations in the two environ-
ments, and the probability of Category x and y for each
configuration, in each environment.6 The different deci-
sion rules built into the probability gain and utility gain
model directly influence the usefulness of features A and
R (Figure 2). Consider Environment 1 (Figure 2, top). If
all correct classifications are rewarded equally and there
is no penalty for incorrect classifications, then Equations
4 and 5 may be used to verify that probability gain and
utility gain both consider Feature A to be more useful
5The optimization procedure itself was similar to that of Nelson et
al. (2010). The main distinction is that Nelson and colleagues con-
trasted various OED models with each other, whereas we contrasted
each asymmetric reward function with probability gain.
6For example, in Environment 1 configuration a2r2 occurs with a
probability of 49.9% and belongs with a probability of 38.8% to Cate-
gory x. Imagine your goal is to maximize total number of correct clas-
sifications. In this case, the stimulus should be classified as Category y,
which is the more likely category (P(y|a2r2) = 61.2%).
But what if correct Category x classifications are rewarded twice as
highly as correct Category y predictions? In this case, the item should
be assigned to x, as 0.388 × 2 > 0.612 × 1.
than Feature R (remember that probability gain and utility
gain are identical under symmetric rewards). By contrast,
if the moderately asymmetric [2 1 0 0] reward structure
applies, according to which correct Category x classifica-
tions are rewarded twice as highly as correct Category y
classifications, Feature R is more useful in terms of max-
imizing reward than Feature A is (Figure 2). Given this
environment and reward structure, maximizing accuracy
and reward at the same time is not possible when select-
ing a single feature to view. In Environment 1, in the ex-
periments, when we refer to an asymmetric reward struc-
ture, it has a [2 1 0 0] payoff function.
We also identified a second environment (Environment
2) in which a strongly asymmetric [10 1 0 0] payoff struc-
ture makes Feature R more useful, but in which Feature
A leads to higher classification accuracy (Figure 2). In
Environment 2, in the experiments, when we refer to an
asymmetric reward structure, we mean a [10 1 0 0] payoff
function.
The results of these optimizations show that, if one’s
goal is to behave adaptively in an environment with asym-
metric payoffs, it is not adequate to use informational
utilities to select pieces of evidence to acquire. The
choice of queries (experiments, or features to view), and
not only the eventual classification decision, must reflect
the environment-specific payoff structure.
7 Overview of Experiments
We studied information search under symmetric and
asymmetric reward functions, in the two environments
identified through our computer simulations. To give a
richer perspective, we manipulated across experiments
the way in which subjects learn about environmental
probabilities and the relevant payoff structure.
In Experiment 1, a neutral experience-based multiple
cue category-learning task was used to convey environ-
mental probabilities to subjects. The categorization task
was followed by a search task, in which subjects gath-
ered information under symmetric or asymmetric real-
money payoffs. When searching under symmetric re-
wards, correct classifications of either category were paid
the same amount of money. Under asymmetric payoffs
correct Category x classifications were paid more money
than correct Category y classifications.
The search task in Experiment 2 was virtually identi-
cal to Experiment 1, involving real-money payoffs, with
the reward structure (symmetric vs. asymmetric) manip-
ulated between conditions. The difference was that in the
initial experience-based learning task subjects learned to
classify stimuli under an asymmetric reward structure.
Subjects received points for correct classification deci-
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Figure 4: Classification-learning task illustrated. A stimulus (“plankton”) is shown and must be categorized as x or
y (“Species A” or “Species B”). In Experiment 1, if the item is correctly categorized, feedback in form of a smiley
appears; if incorrectly classified, a frowny face appears. The learning task in Experiment 2 was virtually the same,
except that instead of a smiley or frowny face, points were associated with correct and incorrect classifications, with the
amount of points earned depending on the reward function (small inset picture, at top right). Erroneous classifications
were associated with zero points.
Example Feedback
Exp. 1 
Exp. 2
t
sions, according to an explicit asymmetric payoff func-
tion (i.e., correct Category x classifications received more
points than correct Category y classifications). Their task
was to learn to make categorization decisions that would
maximize expected reward (points).
In Experiments 1 and 2 alike, after the experience-
based classification task, the search-task payoff structure
was announced with words and numbers; the real-money
payoffs were provided immediately after the experiments.
The objective was to study people’s ability to respond to
asymmetric payoff structures after learning about the sta-
tistical structure of the environment through experience.
No feedback was provided during the search task itself,
to prevent the possibility that search strategies could be
adjusted according to search-task feedback.
Finally, in Experiment 3 we compared search behav-
ior under symmetric vs. asymmetric payoffs in a com-
pletely description-based task, in which both environ-
mental probabilities and payoff functions were presented
with words and numbers.
8 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined whether information search can
adapt to asymmetric reward structures, if people learn
about environmental structure and probabilities through
experience. An initial experience-based multiple cue
probabilistic category-learning task was used to help sub-
jects internalize the probabilistic structure of a particular
environment (Environment 1 or 2, as described above and
in Figure 1).
Our focus was on the subsequent information-search
task, which utilized the same stimuli. In the search task,
however, the features were obscured; people could view
only a single feature (R or A), of their choice, before cat-
egorizing the stimulus, in each trial (Figure 2). Before
the search task, subjects were informed that real-money
payoffs would be provided after the experiment, accord-
ing to the announced (asymmetric or symmetric) payoff
structure.
What goals do people have in search? If people want
to maximize external rewards, they should prefer to view
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Feature R under asymmetric rewards. However, under
symmetric rewards they should preferentially view Fea-
ture A, which maximizes accuracy and reward. By con-
trast, if people have a general preference to search for in-
formation that helps to improve overall accuracy of clas-
sification decisions, they should search Feature A regard-
less of the applicable external payoff function.
8.1 Subjects
Subjects were 91 volunteers—largely university
students—from Berlin (48% female, mean age 26).
They received a show-up fee of 10C and could earn an
additional bonus of up to 20C. Subjects were randomly
assigned to one of four conditions: one of two environ-
ments {Environment 1, Environment 2} × one of two
search-task reward structures {symmetric, asymmetric}.
8.2 Materials and Procedure
The experiment consisted of two tasks, an ini-
tial classification-learning task and a subsequent
information-search task. The learning task involved
categorizing simulated plankton specimens as Category
x or Category y, based on the full feature configuration
(Figure 1). (The categories were described as “Species
A” or “Species B”.) In each trial, a stimulus was chosen
randomly according to the environmental probabilities
and the subject categorized the item as belonging to
Category x or y (Figure 4). Both features were visible
in each stimulus presented, in each trial, throughout the
categorization learning task. Subjects were familiarized
with the two forms of each feature (e.g. a1 vs. a2, and r1
vs. r2) beforehand. After a categorization decision was
made, in a trial, feedback on the true species was given,
accompanied by a smiley or frowny face, depending
on whether the categorization decision was correct or
incorrect (Figure 4, upper-right inset). The assignment
of physical features to probabilities, the polarity of each
feature (e.g., which version of Feature A is considered
a1 and which version is considered a2), and whether
Category x or y was labeled as “Species A”, were
randomized. For each subject, two of three possible
features (“tail”, “eye”, and “claw” of the plankton
specimens) were chosen at random to be used. This led
to 96 randomizations in each condition, one of which
was chosen at random for each subject.
Subjects were instructed to learn to correctly classify
the stimuli, based on the states of features A and R. No ex-
plicit rewards were provided in the learning task. Learn-
ing continued until criterion performance was reached, or
the available time (around 2 hours) elapsed. For any stim-
ulus, the optimal strategy was defined as predicting Cate-
gory x when P(Category x | stimulus) >1/2 and predicting
Category y when P(Category x | stimulus) <1/2. Criterion
performance was defined as (1) making at least 98% opti-
mal (not necessarily correct) responses in the last 200 tri-
als, irrespective of the specific stimuli in those trials; and
(2) making an optimal response in the last five trials of ev-
ery single stimulus type. The latter criterion ensures that
even rare configurations are learned (see Figure 1 for fre-
quencies of stimulus configurations). The purpose of the
strict learning criterion was to ensure that subjects mean-
ingfully assimilated the environmental probabilities, be-
fore the information-acquisition task. Subjects were also
periodically informed at the accuracy they would achieve
if they continued to respond as they did in the last 200
trials, and how well the optimal strategy would perform.
This feedback was given on trial number 500, 750, 1000,
1250, etc.
In the subsequent information-acquisition task, which
comprised ten trials without feedback, subjects contin-
ued to classify the plankton stimuli.7 However, in this
phase the stimuli’s features were obscured, and subjects
could reveal only one of the features on each trial (Fig-
ure 2). The crucial differences, versus the initial learn-
ing task, were that (i) prior to searching a feature it was
uncertain which state it would take, so subjects had to
take into account the individual feature states’ usefulness
and the probability of their occurrence, and (ii) after re-
vealing a feature, classifications had to be made based
on the state of a single feature alone, whereas both fea-
ture values were known in the learning task. The crucial
question was which feature subjects would prefer to view.
The same plankton stimuli, with the same environmental
probabilities as in the learning task, were used; this was
disclosed to subjects.
The payoff scheme was manipulated between subjects.
In the asymmetric reward conditions, which were the
main manipulation of interest, subjects’ received 2C for
correct Category x classifications. The payment for cor-
rect Category y classifications was 1C in Environment
1 ([2 1 0 0] asymmetric reward structure), and 0.2C in
Environment 2 ([10 1 0 0] asymmetric reward structure).
In the symmetric reward conditions subjects received 2C
for each correct classification of either species. In the
asymmetric payoff conditions, Feature A leads to highest
classification accuracy, but Feature R leads to highest ex-
pected reward (Figure 2). In the symmetric rewards con-
ditions, Feature A leads to highest classification accuracy
as well as to highest reward.
7Why just 10 information-search trials? Nelson et al. (2010) used
101 information-search trials. However, within subjects, information-
search behavior was very consistent from one trial to the next. In Nelson
et al.’s Experiment 1, for instance, the median subject viewed the higher
probability gain feature in 100 out of 101 search-task trials. Thus, hav-
ing 100 or more search-task trials would not likely provide additional
information about subjects’ behavior.
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The payoff scheme was presented to subjects before
the information-search task. To prevent learning from
feedback during the search task, no feedback (no smiley
or frowny face, no count of accumulated earnings or num-
ber of correct decisions, or otherwise) was provided dur-
ing the ten search trials themselves. After the end of the
experiment, subjects were given feedback on their correct
and incorrect Category x and y classifications, and paid in
cash according to the previously announced asymmetric
or symmetric payoffs.
To assess how well subjects were calibrated to envi-
ronmental probabilities, subjects were subsequently pre-
sented with all stimuli (plankton specimens), and asked
to estimate for each type the proportion that are each
species, i.e., P(Category x | stimulus), for all four combi-
nations of the features a1r1, a1r2, a2r1, and a2r2. Subjects
also estimated the base rates of the two categories, P(x)
and P(y).
8.3 Results
Most subjects (80/91=88%) achieved the learning crite-
rion well within the available time (∼2h). Two subjects
(one in each environment) were replaced as the experi-
enced probabilities did not match the true environmental
probabilities closely enough to produce the intended or-
dering in features’ relative usefulness.
Our main research questions concerned the
information-search task (Figure 2), in which sub-
jects could only select one feature to view, on each
of the ten trials (Table 1). Most subjects with the
symmetric search-task payoff structure viewed Feature A
on more than half of the search-task trials (27/39 = 69%
of subjects; two-tail binomial p=.02). Surprisingly,
among subjects with the asymmetric payoff structure, a
majority also preferentially viewed Feature A, which has
higher probability gain, rather than Feature R, which has
the higher expected reward under asymmetric payoffs
(28/38=74% of subjects, two-tail binomial p<.01).
Analysis of the mean percentage of views to Feature A,
aggregating across subjects, gives a similar picture. There
was no effect of reward manipulation (Msymmetric=68%,
Masymmetric=68%). The results were similar in Environ-
ment 1 and Environment 2 (Menv1=63%, Menv2=73%).
The possible slight difference between the environments
could reflect some subjects’ sensitivity to information
gain, which prefers Feature A in Environment 2, but Fea-
ture R in Environment 1 (see General Discussion and Fig-
ure 5).
These results extend Nelson et al.’s (2010) finding
that subjects prefer to view higher-probability gain fea-
tures on classification tasks in which no particular costs
or benefits apply. Importantly, the preference to search
higher-probability gain features may apply even when it
is maladaptive given the environmental probabilities and
situation-specific payoffs.
Subjects’ probability estimates for the different feature
configurations were also analyzed. There was good corre-
spondence between subjects’ estimates and the true envi-
ronmental probabilities, indicating that subjects acquired
reasonable knowledge of environmental structure (Table
2).
8.4 Discussion
How can it be that subjects’ probability estimates ap-
peared well calibrated, yet subjects did not search to max-
imize payoffs under asymmetric reward structures? Did
subjects fail to view the reward-maximizing feature be-
cause of a strong desire to maximize classification ac-
curacy? Or were subjects unable to flexibly use their
knowledge of environmental probabilities to identify the
reward-maximizing feature, given an asymmetric reward
function?
One explanation for the preference for Feature A is that
maximizing accuracy serves as a kind of overriding goal
in search behavior, which dominates the external reward
function (i.e., monetary payoffs). For example, over the
course of life, including school history, people may have
learned that being accurate is an important goal in many
situations, and have therefore developed a general pref-
erence for searching for information that allows them to
improve accuracy.
An alternative explanation is that subjects in the asym-
metric payoff conditions did want to earn the most money
possible, but for some reason perceived Feature A to be
most useful, relative to that goal. This idea would match
the (incorrect) intuition that it is reasonable to conduct
queries with the goal of learning the true state of nature
as accurately as possible, and to take asymmetries in the
reward structure into account only in the actual classifi-
cation decision.
A third explanation is that, the theoretical complexities
in calculating individual features’ usefulness notwith-
standing, features’ usefulness was somehow encoded rel-
ative to an implicit accuracy-based reward structure in the
initial classification-learning task. For instance, people
might build up a decision tree that orders features rela-
tive to the accuracy-based learning task structure. Peo-
ple might not be able to use their knowledge of envi-
ronmental probabilities in a flexible way to identify the
most useful queries, in response to the novel asymmet-
ric search-task payoff structures. Such a finding could be
problematic for a Bayesian-decision theoretic account of
cognition and behavior (see General Discussion).
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Table 1: Search-task views to Feature A, which maximizes accuracy, across Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Rewards; Environment % of SS % of views (CI) % of SS % of views (CI) % of SS
Symmetric; Env. 1&2 69% (27/39)* 68% (55%-78%) 9% (2/23)**** 12% (6%-25%) 50% (11/22)
Asymmetric; Env. 1&2 74% (28/38)** 68% (55%-79%) 0% (0/20)**** 2% (0%-6%) 63% (12/19)
Symmetric; Env. 1 60% (12/20) 59% (41%-75%) 8% (1/13)** 11% (3%-28%) 54% (7/13)
Symmetric; Env. 2 79% (15/19)* 77% (60%-89%) 10% (1/10)* 14% (4%-40%) 44% (4/9)
Asymmetric; Env. 1 70% (14/20) 67% (47%-82%) 0% (0/11)*** 1% (0%-5%) 45% (5/11)
Asymmetric; Env. 2 78% (14/18)* 70% (52%-83%) 0% (0/9)** 2% (0%-9%) 88% (7/8)
Note. Under symmetric payoffs, Feature A also leads to highest reward; under asymmetric payoffs, Feature R leads
to highest reward. In Experiment 1, following a neutral category-learning task, subjects preferentially viewed the
accuracy-maximizing feature (A). In Experiment 2, following an asymmetric learning-task reward function, subjects
preferentially viewed the other feature (R). Experiment 3 used a verbally described information-search scenario; no
consistent preference for either feature was observed. 95% confidence intervals (CI) for mean proportion Feature A
views were calculated using bootstrap sampling (bias-corrected and accelerated, in Matlab). In Experiment 1, three
subjects viewed Feature A and Feature R equally often and were excluded (for computing percentage of views to
feature A, these subjects were included). In Experiment 3 one subject ranked Feature A and R as equally useful, and
one subject ranked the uninformative foil feature as more useful; both subjects were excluded. Two-tail, uncorrected
binomial p-values are reported as follows: p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***, p < .0001 = ****. In Experiment
3, and where not specifically noted, results were not significantly different from 50% of subjects preferring to view
Feature A.
9 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the possible
influence of the learning task on search-task behavior,
by explicitly cueing asymmetric payoff structures dur-
ing learning, but was otherwise virtually identical to Ex-
periment 1. As before, a classification-learning task was
followed by an information-search task. The exact same
plankton stimuli, environmental probabilities, and asym-
metric or symmetric search-task payoffs were used. The
main difference was a slight modification to the learning-
task feedback, to explicitly cue the asymmetric environ-
mental payoff structure in the learning task.
After each learning-task trial of Experiment 2, the sub-
ject was shown a number of points (rather than a smiley or
frowny face, as in Experiment 1) according to their clas-
sification decision, and whether it was correct. Correct
Category x classifications were worth more points than
correct Category y classifications, according to the payoff
structure of the environment: twice as much in Environ-
ment 1, and ten times as much in Environment 2. Subjects
were asked to make classification decisions that would
maximize expected reward (points), even when that re-
quires assigning an item to the less likely category.
The information-search task of Experiment 2 was vir-
tually identical to Experiment 1, with the reward structure
(symmetric vs. asymmetric) manipulated between sub-
jects, and the same real-money payoffs. Our goal was
to examine how learning to classify under asymmetric re-
ward functions would influence subsequent information
search under symmetric vs. asymmetric payoffs.8 One
possibility is that people generally prefer to search for
information that improves accuracy. This would be espe-
cially consistent with Nelson et al.’s (2010) interpretation
of their findings. It could also be seen as being consistent
with Maddox and Bohil’s (1998) competition between re-
ward and accuracy (COBRA) hypothesis, although this
model was designed to apply to classification decisions,
not to information-search behavior. In this case, similar
8In each environment (Figure 1), the asymmetric learning-task re-
ward structure ([2 1 0 0] in Environment 1, [10 1 0 0] in Environ-
ment 2) induces a conflict between accuracy and reward maximiza-
tion, for a conflict configuration in which one decision has a higher
expected reward, even though another decision is more likely to be ac-
curate. In Environment 1, the probability that item a2r2 belongs to Cat-
egory y is 61.2% (Figure 1). However, under the asymmetric [2 1 0 0]
payoff scheme (Figure 1c), maximizing points earned requires consis-
tently categorizing this item as belonging to the less likely Category
x. This will yield 2 × 0.388 = 0.776 points on average, as opposed to
1 × 0.612 = 0.612 points when categorizing it as belonging to the more
probable Category y. Similarly, in Environment 2 under the [10 1 0 0]
reward function, item a1r2 has a probability of only 15% of belonging
to Category x. However, categorizing this item as belonging to the less
likely Category x is the reward-maximizing strategy, which will yield
10 × 0.15 = 1.5 points on average, as opposed to 0.85 × 1 = 0.85 points
for categorizing it as Category y.
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findings as in Experiment 1 should be obtained, with a
preference to search Feature A, regardless of the search-
task reward structure.
However, if the asymmetric learning-task payoffs help
people identify the reward-maximizing strategy, a pref-
erence for Feature A should be observed when searching
under symmetric payoffs, and a preference for Feature R
when searching under asymmetric payoffs. Finally, if in-
formation search is driven by the usefulness of features
relative to the learning-phase payoff structure, a general
preference for Feature R could be observed, even for sub-
jects with symmetric search-task payoffs, for whom Fea-
ture A leads to highest accuracy and payoffs.
9.1 Subjects
Subjects were 80 young adult (largely university students;
58% female, mean age 25 years) volunteers from Berlin.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four condi-
tions: one of two environments {Environment 1, Envi-
ronment 2} × one of two search-task reward structures
{symmetric, asymmetric}. They received a show-up fee
of 5C and could earn an additional bonus of up to 20C in
the information-acquisition task.
9.2 Materials and Procedure
Experiment 2 employed the same stimuli and probabilis-
tic environments as Experiment 1. However, explicit
asymmetric reward structures were presented during the
classification learning task. Prior to learning subjects
were informed about the reward structure. In Environ-
ment 1 (asymmetric [2 1 0 0] reward structure; Figure
3c), subjects were told that correct classifications of Cat-
egory x were associated with 2 points, and correct classi-
fications of Category y were associated with 1 point. In
Environment 2 (asymmetric [10 1 0 0] reward structure;
Figure 3d), correct Category x classifications were asso-
ciated with 2 points and correct Category y classifications
were associated with 0.2 points. This point manipulation
was intended to be a heavy-handed way to introduce each
asymmetric reward structure in the learning task. Sub-
jects were explicitly instructed to classify stimuli in a
way that maximizes points earned on average. No points
were accumulated, however, as the goal was for subjects
to learn the probabilities and the optimal response strat-
egy, rather than to incentivize subjects to quickly amass
a large number of learning trials. The assignment of en-
vironmental structure to specific labels and physical fea-
tures in the stimuli was randomized across subjects, as in
Experiment 1.
As in Experiment 1, in each trial a plankton specimen
was chosen randomly according to the environmental
probabilities (Figure 1). After making a classification de-
cision, a “?” symbol at the bottom of the screen changed
to a 2, 1 or 0.2 (according to the reward function and the
category) if the decision was correct, or to a 0 if the deci-
sion was incorrect (Figure 4, upper-right inset). Learning
continued until the subject’s performance approximated
a reward-maximizing classifier that on each trial chooses
the category with the higher expected reward. The pre-
cise learning criterion was analogous to Experiment 1,
namely both (1) making at least 98% reward-maximizing
responses in the last 200 trials, irrespective of the stim-
uli in those trials; and (2) making reward-maximizing re-
sponses in the last five trials of every single stimulus type.
Feedback on the points they would earn on average, if
they continued as in the last 200 trials, and the number of
points that the optimal classifier would earn on average,
was given after trial 200, 400, 600, 800, etc. (Feedback
was slightly increased, vs. Experiment 1, because pilot
work suggested that the learning task of Experiment 2
would be more difficult.) The instructions, and this pe-
riodic feedback, both emphasized that in some cases, it
may be necessary to choose the less-probable category,
to obtain the highest expected points.
The information-search task of Experiment 2 was vir-
tually identical to that of Experiment 1. Half of the sub-
jects were assigned to symmetric search-task payoffs, in
which correct Category x and correct Category y classifi-
cations each paid 2C. Given this symmetric payoff struc-
ture, Feature A, which leads to higher classification accu-
racy, also leads to higher expected payoffs (Figure 2). In
this case, note that neither the goal of maximizing accu-
racy nor the goal of maximizing reward would suggest
viewing Feature R. Half of the subjects were assigned
to an asymmetric search-task reward function. When
searching under asymmetric rewards, Feature A maxi-
mizes classification accuracy (but does not improve ex-
pected reward), whereas Feature R maximizes expected
reward (but does not improve overall classification accu-
racy). In Environment 1, correct Category x classifica-
tions paid 2C and correct Category y classifications paid
1C. In Environment 2, correct Category x classifications
paid 2C and correct Category y classifications paid 0.2C.
In each environment, the asymmetric search-task re-
ward structure exactly matched the point structure that
had been experienced in the learning task. The payoff
structure that would apply was presented to subjects be-
fore the information-search task. Subjects were explic-
itly instructed to choose a feature to view, so as to earn
the most money. As in Experiment 1, there were ten
information-search trials, with no feedback during those
trials. Real-money payoffs were given after the exper-
iment according to the decisions made and the applica-
ble payoff function. After the search task, subjects were
given a separate questionnaire with which they rated en-
vironmental probabilities, as in Experiment 1.
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Table 2: Subjects’ median probability estimates.
Environment 1 Environment 2
Item True percent Experiment 1 Experiment 2 True percent Experiment 1 Experiment 2
P(x) 44% 36% 50% 36% 25% 35%
P(x | a1 r1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0%
P(x | a1 r2) 65% 73% 70% 15% 11% 25%
P(x | a2 r1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 0%
P(x | a2 r2) 39% 35% 53% 81% 85% 90%
Note. The item being judged is in the left column; its true percent next; and the median of subjects’
estimated percentages next. In this table, “x” denotes whichever category was less probable in a
particular subject’s randomization. Overall, subjects were well-calibrated, especially in Experiment
1. Most individual subjects appeared qualitatively well-calibrated, as well. In Experiment 2, there
may be a tendency to overestimate the probability of Category x, perhaps due to the asymmetric
learning-task reward structure in which correct Category x classifications have a higher payoff than
correct Category y classifications.
Table 3: Learning difficulty across Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 1 Experiment 2
% learners % learners Median learning trials Median learning trials
Environment 1 82% (40/49) 60% (24/40) 469 733
Environment 2 95% (40/42) 48% (19/40) 280 794
Note. The number of learning trials is based on learners only. Experiment 2’s asymmetric learning-task reward
structure made learning much more difficult than in Experiment 1. This is reflected by the smaller proportion
of learners, and the learners’ higher number of learning-task trials. The especially strong difference in number
of learning trials required in Environment 2, between the experiments, could be due to its especially high conflict
(with the highly asymmetric [10 1 0 0] reward structure) between reward and accuracy maximization (configuration
a1r2, see Figure 1). See Appendix, Figure A1, for more detailed learning-task results.
9.3 Results and Discussion
Only about half of the subjects (43/80 = 54%) reached
the learning criterion in the ∼2h available for learning,
in contrast to virtually all (80/91 = 88%) subjects in Ex-
periment 1. Even restricting consideration to the learn-
ers, a greater number of trials were needed, in the same
environments, than in Experiment 1 (Table 3). Analysis
of learning data shows that the difficulty in learning in
Experiment 2 stemmed from the need to choose the less-
probable (but higher-rewarded) category, on the conflict
configurations for which Category y was more probable
but a Category x response had higher expected reward
(Appendix, Figure A1). On these stimuli, the vast major-
ity of subjects first responded in a way that would maxi-
mize accuracy, rather than reward, and only later shifted
to the reward-maximizing response strategy. The learning
task in Experiment 2 can itself be seen as an extension of
the signal detection theory paradigm into a multiple-cue
probabilistic category learning task. These learning-task
results suggest that the competition between reward and
accuracy (COBRA) hypothesis may extend to multiple-
cue category learning tasks under asymmetric rewards.
Our research questions concerned information search
under asymmetric-vs.-symmetric rewards, in the subse-
quent information-search task. In stark contrast to Ex-
periment 1, almost all learners preferentially viewed Fea-
ture R (Table 1). The preference to view Feature R was
seen when that feature improved expected reward, in the
asymmetric reward conditions (20 of 20 subjects: two-
tail binomial p < .0001). Remarkably, this preference
was also seen when a symmetric reward function—under
which Feature A maximizes both accuracy and reward—
was used (21 of 23 subjects: two-tail binomial p < .0001).
Analysis of the mean percent of views to Feature A con-
firms these findings (Msymmetric=12%, Masymmetric=2%).
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This is particularly remarkable, as under symmetric pay-
offs Feature R does not improve classification accuracy
or reward.
This clarifies the meaning of results from Experiment
1, as well as Nelson et al. (2010). People do not always
prefer to view higher-probability gain features. In Exper-
iment 2, which used an asymmetric environmental reward
structure during learning, the lower-probability gain fea-
ture (Feature R) was preferentially viewed in the search
task, even when doing so was suboptimal with respect to
both reward and accuracy, given a symmetric search-task
payoff structure.
Together with Experiment 1, these results suggest that,
rather than subjects having the capacity to flexibly adapt
search behavior following experience-based learning and
a goal of being accurate, their information search seems
to be driven by the importance of features as identified
during learning under an explicit asymmetric or (in Ex-
periment 1) implicit symmetric reward function. In Ex-
periment 2, the strong finding is that, irrespective of the
search-task payoff structure (the manipulation of which
had little-to-no effect on search behavior), subjects pre-
ferred to view Feature R. Across both experiments, sub-
jects tended to view the feature that would have been the
most useful, if the learning-task reward structure were
preserved in the search task, irrespective of the actual
search-task reward structure. Put more poignantly, it may
be that for people to search appropriately in environments
with asymmetric payoff structures, the payoff structures
themselves must also be learned through experience.
These results strongly argue against the idea that peo-
ple have a universal accuracy goal in search. They also
argue against the idea that people can adaptively search
according to novel announced payoff structures, follow-
ing experience-based learning of environmental probabil-
ities. Relative to the COBRA hypothesis, there is no ev-
idence of a conflict between reward and accuracy in the
search-task behavior per se. This conflict is seen in the
learning task. In the search task, however, search behav-
ior follows whichever way the reward-accuracy conflict
was resolved in the learning task.
10 Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 both used experience-based learn-
ing to convey environmental probabilities to subjects.
Most research on information acquisition, however, has
used words and numbers to convey environmental proba-
bilities. Experiment 3 therefore examined information-
search behavior under asymmetric payoffs when envi-
ronmental probabilities are conveyed through summary
statistics. Subjects were the 43 people who success-
fully completed Experiment 2. Upon completion of the
experience-based learning task and information-search
task in Experiment 2, subjects were presented with a ver-
bally described information-search scenario in which the
task was to categorize fictitious aliens into two species
(adapted from the “Planet Vuma task”, Skov & Sher-
man, 1986). In this scenario, subjects’ task was to
identify the species of an invisible alien (“Glom” vs.
“Fizo”), by querying certain features (e.g., “wearing a
hula hoop”). For each subject, the environmental prob-
abilities (categories’ base rates and feature likelihoods)
and the symmetric or asymmetric reward function were
identical to the experience-based plankton classification
task that they had just completed in Experiment 2. (The
homology between the tasks was not disclosed.) In Ex-
periment 3, subjects ranked the features’ usefulness, rel-
ative to the explicitly provided reward function, rather
than actually viewing features and categorizing individ-
ual stimuli. Base rates were verbally described in terms of
percentages (e.g., “Out of one million creatures on planet
Vuma, 44% are Fizos and 56% are Gloms”). Feature like-
lihoods were presented in a table, denoting what percent-
age of each species possessed each feature (e.g., “56% of
Fizos wear a hula hoop”). An uninformative third fea-
ture, present in 0% or 100% of both species, was also
included, as a foil to ensure that subjects understood the
information presented.
The same payoff structure as the subject had just expe-
rienced in Experiment 2 was used. Here, it was described
in terms of points (e.g., “For each correct classification of
a Glom you get 2 points. For each correct classification of
a Fizo you get 1 point.”). Subjects were asked to rank or-
der the questions according to their usefulness: “Consid-
ering the information given, what questions would most
help you to earn the most points possible?” A bonus of
5C was given if the questions were correctly ranked in
order of their usefulness (i.e., A > R under symmetric re-
wards and R > A under asymmetric rewards, with the use-
less feature not ranked higher than Feature A or R).
10.1 Results and Discussion
In the summary-statistics-based scenario there was no
discernible preference between the features. There does
not appear to be any effect of the payoff manipulation, ei-
ther (Table 1). If anything, the trend is in the wrong direc-
tion: under asymmetric rewards, 63% of people ranked
Feature A to be more useful than Feature R (two-tail bi-
nomial p=.17), whereas under symmetric payoffs 50% of
the subjects ranked Feature A to be more useful.
These results add to Nelson et al.’s (2010) finding
that there is little relationship between actual search be-
havior following experience-based learning and judg-
ments of features’ usefulness, based on summary statis-
tics. The present data further show that there may be
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no effect of an explicit payoff manipulation, in an ab-
stract summary-statistics-based information search sce-
nario. These data contribute to a body of research, which
has focused on risky-choice gambling decisions, examin-
ing the circumstances under which there are differences
in description- versus experience-based decisions (Hadar
& Fox, 2009; Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev, 2004;
Hertwig & Pleskac, 2010; Ungemach, Chater & Stewart,
2009).
11 General Discussion
Does experience-based classification learning provide a
foundation for adaptive information search in environ-
ments with asymmetric reward structures? We addressed
this in Experiment 1, using experience-based classifi-
cation learning, with natural sampling and immediate
feedback, to train people in the statistical structure of
two probabilistic environments. Subsequently subjects
searched for information under symmetric vs. asymmet-
ric payoffs. Remarkably, even given experience-based
learning and subjects’ reasonable explicit knowledge of
environmental probabilities, there was no perceptible ef-
fect of the payoff manipulation on the feature subjects
preferred to view in the search task. Rather, most sub-
jects preferentially searched Feature A, which had higher
probability gain (i.e., led to higher accuracy), irrespec-
tive of whether it led to higher rewards or not, given the
monetary payoff structure in the information-search task.
Is there any way for people to learn to choose infor-
mation adaptively in environments with asymmetric re-
ward structures? Experiment 2 addressed this by ex-
plicitly giving subjects asymmetric reward structures in
the initial categorization-learning task. Subjects were in-
structed to classify so as to obtain the highest average
reward, even if that required assigning an item to the less-
likely (but higher-rewarded) category. In the subsequent
information-search task, which itself was identical to Ex-
periment 1, subjects could view only a single feature be-
fore making a categorization decision. In stark contrast
to Experiment 1, the vast majority of subjects preferen-
tially viewed Feature R, irrespective of whether doing so
was adaptive given the search-task payoff structure. This
refutes the idea that people have a general tendency to
maximize accuracy in search. Experience-based learn-
ing does not necessarily lead to a preference to view the
higher-probability gain feature. Rather, search behavior
seems to have been driven by the (implicit or explicit)
reward-scheme experienced during the previous classifi-
cation learning task. The difficulty subjects had in learn-
ing in Experiment 2 suggests that accuracy is an espe-
cially intuitive payoff function; even with great encour-
agement, around half of the subjects failed to achieve
learning criterion in Experiment 2. The proximal driver
of search-task information-acquisition behavior does not
seem to be the actual search-task payoff structure, but
rather something taken more directly from the learning
task.
Experiment 3 found that, when probabilistic informa-
tion and reward structures were both conveyed through
summary statistics, people were indifferent regarding the
usefulness of the alternative features. This was found for
both symmetric and asymmetric reward schemes.
11.1 Did the search-task payoff manipula-
tions have any effect?
Did the manipulations perhaps shift decision criteria in
the desired direction, but just not far enough? Research
on perceptual category learning—which is not concerned
with information search, but rather with classification de-
cisions when full stimulus information is available—has
found that people are able to take asymmetric payoff
functions into account, but only to a limited extent, when
setting their decision criterion for classification decisions
(e.g., Maddox & Bohil, 1998). We therefore analyzed
whether the asymmetric search-task payoff manipulation
could perhaps have shifted the decision criterion some-
what, in the correct direction, but not enough to cause
subjects to preferentially view the feature with higher ex-
pected payoff. Note that this hypothesis is compatible
with the ideas that people effectively learn environmen-
tal probabilities through their experience, and can search
adaptively relative to asymmetric reward structures. It is
just that under this hypothesis it is difficult to internalize
an asymmetric reward structure.
Consider Environment 1, in which a [2 1 0 0] asym-
metric reward structure applied in the search task. In this
environment, one can calculate that if the reward func-
tion is a less-asymmetric [1.38 1 0 0], then Feature A
and Feature R would have objectively equal usefulness
(Equation 5). This hypothetical indifference reward func-
tion implies a decision criterion cx=42%, rather than the
reward-maximizing decision criterion of 33% (Equation
2). The upshot is that subjects could have been slightly
influenced by the search task payoff manipulation, with
their internal decision criterion shifting in the appropri-
ate direction (say, to 46%), and yet Feature A would have
been objectively more useful than Feature R, relative to
this slightly-asymmetric internalized reward function. In
Environment 2, similarly, a person who internalized a re-
ward function of the form [4.57 1 0 0], rather than the
actual [10 1 0 0] payoff structure, would find Feature R
and Feature A to be equally useful.
If making mistakes is intrinsically psychologically un-
pleasant, irrespective of the actual extrinsic payoff func-
tion (which in the present experiments included zero
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Table 4: Informative search-task classification decisions.
Search-task
rewards
Higher-rewarded response,
given feature r2
Exp. 1: Responses of
Category x, given feature r2
Exp. 2: Responses of
Category x, given feature r2
Symmetric x ≈ y 58% (62/106) 96% (152/158)
Asymmetric x 72% (73/101) 100% (162/162)
Note. Subjects’ responses, given that they had searched Feature R, and observed r2, in the information-search
task in Experiments 1 and 2 (aggregated over Environments 1 and 2). Given r2, categories x and y are effectively
equally likely. Under symmetric payoffs, both responses have the same expected value, but under asymmetric
payoffs assigning the item to Category x has higher expected value. Results across the experiments suggest that
the learning task is the primary determinant of the feature subjects view in the search task, and that there is little
or no influence of the search-task payoff manipulation. The difference in proportion of Category x responses
given feature r2, under symmetric versus asymmetric rewards, is not statistically reliable (see text).
penalty for mistakes), this would also result in a less-
extreme decision criterion cx. Suppose a subject in the
[2 1 0 0] payoff condition intuits one unit cost for each
mistake, thereby internalizing an effective [2 1 1 1] re-
ward function. This subject should adopt a decision cri-
terion cx = 40%, closer to 50% than the optimal 33% cri-
terion (Equation 2). Any intrinsic psychological cost of
making mistakes, where that cost applies equally to each
kind of mistake (i.e. where m = n), would have a simi-
lar effect in shifting the decision criterion towards 50%.
Thus, Experiment 1’s information-acquisition results do
not preclude that there may be a small influence, in the
appropriate direction, of the explicitly stated search-task
reward function. Rather, the results show that such an
influence, if it exists, is very small.
Search-task categorization responses, which required
subjects to make decisions based on a single feature
value, may provide some additional insights into the
(in)efficacy of the search-task payoff manipulation. In
cases where Feature r2 was observed, the posterior prob-
abilities of Category x and Category y were effectively
equal (Table 4; Figure 2). Thus, if the reward manip-
ulation had any effect whatsoever, subjects in the asym-
metric reward conditions should strongly prefer to choose
the more highly rewarded Category x, given Feature r2, in
the search task. Note further that, if either of the above
hypotheses are true—namely that people applied a decel-
erating nonlinear function to the utilities (e.g. and per-
ceived [2 1 0 0] payoffs as [1.38 1 0 0])—or if the intrin-
sic cost of error hypothesis is true (e.g., [2 1 0 0] pay-
offs are perceived as [2 1 1 1]), then subjects should still
overwhelmingly respond Category x given Feature r2, un-
der asymmetric payoffs, in both environments. The data
from Experiment 1 strongly contradict even these weaker
hypotheses about the possible influence of the search-
task payoff manipulation; only about 72% of subjects’
responses were for Category x, given Feature r2 (Table
4).
However, the raw data do suggest a trend in which sub-
jects with asymmetric rewards had a higher propensity to
choose Category x given r2 than did subjects with sym-
metric rewards (Table 4). We used bootstrap sampling
to estimate 95% confidence intervals for true proportion
of Category x responses, given r2, under symmetric vs.
asymmetric rewards: Msymmetric=58%, CI from 39% to
76% and Masymmetric=72%, CI from 54% to 87%. The
highly overlapping confidence intervals show that there
is no statistically reliable effect of the payoff manipula-
tion.9
What about Experiment 2? In Experiment 2, almost all
classification decisions, given feature r2, were for Cate-
gory x. Given this ceiling effect, it is not possible to ad-
dress whether the search-phase reward manipulation had
an effect in Experiment 2. What is overwhelmingly clear,
in Experiment 2 and Experiment 1 alike, is that subjects
meaningfully assimilated the learning-task reward struc-
ture.
11.2 Alternate explanations
People are often risk-averse, for instance by preferring
a retirement investment with a smaller expected return
but much-less-variable return to a highly variable invest-
ment with a higher expected return. When small amounts
of money are involved, little risk aversion is usually ob-
served. That makes risk-aversion an a priori improba-
ble, though still conceivable, hypothesis in Experiments
1 and 2. Could risk-aversion explain these results, on the
assumption that people understood the underlying prob-
abilities and payoff structure? In the asymmetric payoff
conditions, in each environment, although Feature A has
9A standard difference-of-proportions test would falsely assume that
the underlying data (including successive responses from the same sub-
ject, which tend to be the same) are independent.
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Table 5: Expected values (and standard deviations) of
Features A and R (in C).
Symmetric rewards Asymmetric rewards
Feature A Feature R Feature A Feature R
Env. 1 1.28 (0.96) 1.13 (0.99) 0.88 (0.77) 1.00 (0.94)
Env. 2 1.64 (0.77) 1.28 (0.96) 0.72 (0.86) 0.78 (0.92)
a lower expected payoff than Feature R, Feature A also
has lower standard deviation in payoff (Table 5). Thus,
it would be conceivable that risk aversion could explain
subjects’ preference to view Feature A, given asymmet-
ric payoffs, in Experiment 1. In the symmetric payoff
conditions, however, Feature A has higher expected pay-
off as well as lower standard deviation in expected payoff
(Table 5). Thus, in Experiment 2, risk aversion cannot
possibly explain why subjects overwhelmingly preferred
to view Feature R, given symmetric payoffs. Risk aver-
sion is not a possible explanation of results across the two
experiments.
Can alternate optimal experimental design (OED)
models (Nelson, 2005, 2008) or heuristic strategies (e.g.,
Martignon et al., 2008) explain people’s choices of fea-
tures to view? Different models, such as information gain
and impact, make various claims about the usefulness of
individual features, in each environment (Figure 5; Ap-
pendix, Table A1). For example, in Environment 1 the in-
formation gain (expected reduction in Shannon entropy)
of Feature R is higher than that of Feature A, whereas in
Environment 2, Feature A has a higher information gain
than Feature R. Thus, information gain cannot explain
why people preferred Feature A in both environments in
Experiment 1, but Feature R in both environments in Ex-
periment 2, nor why people had no preference in Exper-
iment 3. The OED and heuristic models, as articulated
to date, were designed to provide general-purpose strate-
gies for information acquisition. They were not designed
to apply to situation-specific payoff functions. Accord-
ingly, these models do not predict changes as a function
of learning- or of search-task reward manipulations, or
information formats. Hence, these models cannot explain
why search behavior differs between Experiments 1, 2,
and 3.
Were the stakes not high enough? Nelson et al. (2010,
Experiment 3, Condition 2), in a task with no external re-
wards or payoffs, found that a difference of as little as
4.5 percentage points in features’ probability gain was
enough to induce a strong preference to view the higher-
probability-gain feature. The consistency across subjects
in the present experiments, especially the preference to
view Feature R in Experiment 2, suggests that subjects
did not pick features at random to view, but were in fact
highly motivated.
Do people dispense with probabilities altogether, and
learn according to experienced outcomes and expected
rewards (i.e., learn only expected values of actions; e.g.,
Barron & Erev, 2003)? The learning data strongly con-
tradict this idea. Experiment 1 demonstrated that both
environments are learnable. However, in Experiment 2
subjects struggled a great deal with the learning task (Ta-
ble 3; Appendix, Figure A1), due to the conflict config-
uration in each environment, in which Category y was
more probable, but a Category x classification choice had
higher expected reward. This should not be a problem
for a purely expectation-based system, which could easily
identify which categorization action has the highest ex-
pected reward, for each configuration, within a few hun-
dred trials. Experiment 2 showed that it takes a great deal
of training for human subjects to respond contrary to ac-
curacy in the learning task. Anecdotal evidence for this
also comes from one of our subjects who, after failing
to learn to classify under asymmetric payoffs, stated “It
feels weird to be wrong” in choosing the less-probable
category in the conflict configuration. In any case, it is not
trivial mathematically to go from the learning task to the
search task, because the search-task requires marginaliz-
ing over the unobserved feature, and a preposterior analy-
sis of the expected usefulness of each feature. Therefore,
a simple reinforcement-based account of the learning task
could not simultaneously explain search-task behavior.
11.3 Representations, decision strategies,
and reward structures in learning and
information search
For developing psychological theories, Anderson (1990)
proposed beginning with minimal mechanistic assump-
tions, and making more specific processing assumptions
only when necessary. Following the results of Nelson et
al. (2010), we began with the idea that people can be-
come familiar with environmental probabilities through
experience-based learning, and that we would investi-
gate people’s goals for information search when asym-
metric payoffs apply. In line with Bayesian decision the-
ory (Savage, 1954) we assumed that people would have
separate representation of beliefs (probabilities) and util-
ities (costs and benefits), which would allow them to de-
termine possible questions’ usefulness, relative to their
goals.
Subjects in Experiments 1 and 2 appeared to have
developed a reasonable understanding of environmental
probabilities (Table 2). Nevertheless, they were unable to
use that knowledge in a flexible way to identify the most
useful query, given novel search-task payoff structures.
These results point to the importance of more precisely
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Figure 5: Information-search behavior: data and theoret-
ical models. Dark grey represents Feature A, light grey
Feature R. Empirical search-task results are displayed in
the top row (% of subjects preferentially viewing Fea-
tures A vs. R) and next-to-top row (mean views to Fea-
tures A vs. R); subsequent rows show predictions of al-
ternate informational OED models (Table A1). MaxVal
and ZigVal (Martignon et al., 2008), two heuristic mod-
els, also prefer Feature R. None of these models captures
the differences between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2,
as none of these models makes different predictions ac-
cording to the procedure during the categorization learn-
ing task. The final row, Learning-phase Reward, captures
the idea that following experience-based learning people
preferentially view whichever feature would have been
most important, relative to the reward structure and goals
in the learning task (see text and Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Decision trees that might be established during
the learning task. Depending on the goal of the classifi-
cation task (maximizing overall accuracy in Experiment
1 vs. maximizing rewards in Experiment 2), features’ rel-
ative usefulness differs. In Experiment 1, subjects were
trained to choose whichever category is most probable,
given the presented stimulus. To most efficiently achieve
this, with minimal feature views, Feature A should be
the root node. By contrast, in Experiment 2 subjects
learned to classify under asymmetric rewards, with the
goal of categorizing stimuli in a way that maximizes ex-
pected reward. This goal is most efficiently achieved by
first querying Feature R, which has higher usefulness than
Feature A (i.e., higher utility gain). (In fact, categorizing
stimuli based on the state of Feature R alone is sufficient
to maximize expected rewards. Therefore, in the trees,
both states of Feature A lead to the same decision.)
Experiment 1
Environment 1
A
a1a2
Environment 2
A
a1a2
RCat. y
r1r2
Cat. yR
r1r2
Cat. x Cat. y Cat. x Cat. y
Experiment 2
Environment 1
R
Environment 2
R
r1r2
Cat. yA
a1a2
r1r2
Cat. yA
a1a2
Cat. x Cat. x Cat. x Cat. x
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characterizing the algorithm-level (in Marr’s, 1982, clas-
sification) cognitive processes and representations that
develop during experience-based learning.
What learning processes might underlie the present ex-
periments? Research on concept learning shows that,
even in tasks in which people could in principle view ev-
ery feature in each trial, they learn to allocate attention
to efficiently view features sequentially (Blair, Watson,
Walshe & Maj, 2009; Rehder & Hoffman, 2005). Com-
putational models have been developed to explain the al-
location of eye movements to specific stimulus features
on Shepard, Hovland and Jenkins’s (1961; Nosofsky,
Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley & Glauthier, 1994) concept
formation task (Love, 2010; Nelson & Cottrell, 2007).
With respect to the present findings, we propose that
people do something similar, namely learn the decision
tree that is most efficient—i.e., that requires the smallest
number of feature views, on average—subject to the con-
straint of having optimal performance, relative to the (im-
plicit or explicit) reward function during learning. When
constructing these trees (Figure 6), we used the explicit
asymmetric learning-task reward structure for Experi-
ment 2, and a symmetric reward structure for Experiment
1. In this case, the result is the acquisition of a fast-and-
frugal decision tree (Bergert & Olsson, in preparation;
Green & Mehr, 1997; Luan et al., 2011; Martignon et al.,
2008).
We hypothesize that this tree is what later drives peo-
ple’s search-task behavior: Choices of which feature to
view reflect the learning-task search hierarchy, rather than
any judgment of features’ relative usefulness per se. This
process works well if the search task retains the learning-
task payoff structure, but can work poorly otherwise,
even when the new payoff structure is as straightforward
as monetary payoffs for accuracy.
To illustrate, consider the tree for Environment 1, in
Experiment 1. When a stimulus is presented, one first
looks at Feature A. If a2 is observed, the stimulus can be
assigned to Category y, as this is now the more probable
category regardless of the state of Feature R (Figure 1).
The state of R needs to be checked only if a1 is observed,
as the item is more likely to belong to Category y when
R=r1, but more likely to be x when R=r2, given a1. The
tree structure is similar for Environment 2.
By contrast, in Experiment 2, where people had to as-
sign stimuli to the higher rewarded category, Feature R
is more useful, and is the root node of the search trees.
In fact, people could in principle reach criterion perfor-
mance by making decisions based on Feature R alone.
Whenever R=r1, stimuli should be assigned to Category
y, and when R=r2, to Category x (Figure 1). However,
the different kinds of mistakes made for the various con-
figurations during learning show that subjects considered
both features (Appendix, Figure A1). Subjects‘ proba-
bility estimates also show that they were sensitive to the
influence of the state of Feature A. For example, the me-
dian estimate for P(x | a1 r2) was 25%, but for P(x | a2 r2)
was 90% (Table 2), close to the true values of 15% and
81%, respectively. Therefore, we kept both features in
the tree for Experiment 2.
Introducing a new reward function in the search task
requires rearranging the tree in some cases, to achieve the
most efficient tree, and changing classification decisions
associated with some exit nodes. Such a re-ordering may
be difficult, and might even require new learning experi-
ences and feedback. The announcement, via words and
numbers, of a new search-task payoff structure was not
enough, no matter how well people appeared to have as-
similated the environmental probabilities in the learning
task.
In sum, for development of a comprehensive theory of
human information acquisition, the present results sug-
gest (1) not taking a simplistic decision-theoretic view of
probability learning as distinct from rewards that could
drive search behavior, and (2) focusing on the nature of
the learners’ goals, decision strategies, and any specific
habits in the learning process (e.g., eye movement search
ordering among the features).
11.4 The value of information in real-world
decisions
What about real-world search decisions? Physicians
sometimes use fast-and-frugal trees to search for informa-
tion and to make medical diagnoses (Fischer et al., 2002;
Green & Mehr, 1997).10 This fits with our ideas on the
use of search-and-classification trees learned through ex-
perience, which can adapt to situation-specific costs and
benefits through the arrangement of the exit nodes (Luan
et al., 2011). Such simple decision trees are also used
to train medical personnel for making classification de-
cisions during mass casualty incidents, enabling first re-
sponders to classify and prioritize victims according to
the severity of their injuries, as they are easy to apply,
even under stressful conditions (Super, 1984, as cited in
Luan et al., 2011).
In applied contexts within medical decision making
and environmental toxicology, some studies have explic-
itly employed quantitative value of information analy-
ses (Yokota & Thompson, 2004; see also Benish, 2002,
2009). However, the explicit use of this methodology has
developed slowly, perhaps in part because of the compli-
cated mathematics of the real world. For instance, it is not
10There may be a general bias in favor of medical testing, and con-
flicts of interest that can arise when the practitioner is specifically paid
to conduct a test. We view these as exogenous issues that could af-
fect medicine severely, but which are separate from people’s underlying
information-search capacities.
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trivial to identify a reasonable utility function to incorpo-
rate both financial costs, and changes in life expectancy
and quality of life. Whichever utility function is adopted,
it is important to appropriately discount future returns ac-
cording to when they will occur. However, Yokota and
Thompson note that around half of studies did not report
use of temporal discounting in their analyses.
It does seem that in some circumstances, for instance in
deciding to test for a rare but serious disease, people may
appropriately take asymmetric payoffs into account. An-
other example would be airport security personnel’s thor-
ough pre-flight screening of a person exhibiting mildly
suspicious behavior. It need not be more likely than not,
or even very likely at all, that the individual present a
threat; the costs of failing to detect a bomb are high, jus-
tifying low thresholds for screening. In these examples
the basic reward structures (e.g., the high cost of missing
a serious-yet-treatable disease, or of missing a bomb on
an airplane) are very intuitive. There is also ample oppor-
tunity to train practitioners on the payoff structure appli-
cable in particular medical or security contexts. We take
our present results to suggest, at a minimum, that without
a situation with an intuitive and easily-internalized ratio-
nale for a particular asymmetric payoff structure, spon-
taneously adaptive search behavior could be difficult to
achieve.
11.5 Future directions
One important area for future research will be to directly
compare scenarios with intuitive and strongly asymmet-
ric payoff structures with theoretically-identical abstract
scenarios. Baron and Hershey (1988) described different
diseases abstractly. One manipulation could compare ab-
stract disease names with names that cue strongly asym-
metric consequences, for instance where one disease is al-
most certainly deadly, but the other disease is akin to hav-
ing the flu. Experience-based learning, perhaps in a way
similar to our present experiments, could be used in both
cases. It would also be interesting to investigate whether
the type of learning-phase feedback matters, when the ex-
trinsic search-task payoff structure is intuitive.
From the perspective of human learners, not all util-
ities are created equal. Learning is considerably eas-
ier under an implicit symmetric payoff structure (or at
least, without an explicitly asymmetric payoff structure),
as seen in Experiment 1. Learning is considerably more
difficult under an asymmetric payoff structure, as seen in
Experiment 2, where roughly half of subjects failed to
achieve the learning criterion. Search behavior following
learning, however, is an entirely different animal. Fol-
lowing experience-based learning in a particular environ-
ment, with a particular reward structure, people are able
to spontaneously identify which features would be most
useful to query, even in abstract probabilistic simulated
plankton categorization tasks. This is a positive finding
that supports a theory of diverse cognitive abilities. It
suggests that even in environments with arbitrary reward
structures (e.g., in which a disease is very serious, and its
treatment—if given unnecessarily—is fairly harmless), if
people learn the environment, individual features, and
the reward structure through their own experience, they
will spontaneously have very good intuitions as to which
queries are most useful, even in situations where the most
useful queries do not improve classification accuracy.
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Appendix
Table A1: Alternative optimal experimental design (OED) models.
Probability Gain (PG)
uPG (d) = max
i
(P (ci | d)) − max
i
(P (ci))(Baron, 1985)
Information gain (IG)
uIG (d) =
n∑
i=1
P (ci) log2
1
P (ci)
−
n∑
i=1
P (ci | d) log2
1
P (ci | d)(Lindley, 1956)
Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL)
uKL (d) =
n∑
i=1
P (ci | d) log2
P (ci | d)
P (ci)(Kullback & Leibler, 1951)
Impact (Imp)
uImp (d) =
n∑
i=1
|P (ci ) − P (ci | d) |(Wells & Lindsay, 1980)
Bayesian Diagnosticity (BD)
uBD (d) = max
(
P (d | c1)
P (d | c2)
,
P (d | c2)
P (d | c1)
)
(Good, 1950)
Log10 Diagnosticity (log10BD) ulog10BD (d) = log10
(
max
(
P (d | c1)
P (d | c2)
,
P (d | c2)
P (d | c1)
))
Note. Alternative optimal experimental design (OED) models proposed to quantify the usefulness of a datum d (a
feature value, test result, answer) to identify an object’s category C={c1, . . . , cn} (for reviews, see Nelson 2005,
2008). The expected usefulness of a query (test, question, experiment) is calculated as the average usefulness of
the data, where the usefulness of each datum d is weighted by its probability (Equation 3). See Figure 5 for model
predictions for the current experiments. Bayesian Diagnosticity and Log10 Diagnosticity are only defined for binary
categories.
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Table A2: Analysis of Baron and Hershey’s (1988) scenarios in which study subjects chose which of two medical
tests (T1 or T2) was most useful (Experiment 1, Cases 5–11).
Case 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
P(disease) 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.75
T1 true positive 0.84 0.88 0.92 0.84 0.92 0.88 0.88
T1 false positive 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.28 0.28
T2 true positive 0.76 0.72 0.68 0.76 0.68 0.72 0.72
T2 false positive 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.12
harm 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
neglect 1 1 1 3 1 3 1
T1 expected utility 0.050 0.300 0.050 0.100 0.100 0.450 0.450
T2 expected utility 0.050 0.300 0.050 0.100 0.100 0.450 0.450
T1 probability gain 0.050 0.300 0.050 0.260 0.340 0.010 0.090
T2 probability gain 0.050 0.300 0.050 0.340 0.260 0.090 0.010
T1 information gain 0.167 0.289 0.280 0.212 0.383 0.212 0.231
T2 information gain 0.280 0.289 0.167 0.383 0.212 0.231 0.212
T1 impact 0.195 0.300 0.255 0.260 0.340 0.225 0.225
T2 impact 0.255 0.300 0.195 0.340 0.260 0.225 0.225
T1 diagnosticity 3.096 4.343 7.177 3.307 6.213 4.771 3.914
T2 diagnosticity 7.177 4.343 3.096 6.213 3.308 3.914 4.771
T1 log10 diagnosticity 0.480 0.615 0.816 0.507 0.749 0.657 0.573
T2 log10 diagnosticity 0.816 0.615 0.480 0.749 0.507 0.573 0.657
SS’ prefs., T2 T1≈T2 T1 T1≈T2 T1 ≈T2 T1 T2
(percentage format) t=−2.29 t=2.94 t=3.62 t=−3.50
SS’ prefs, T1≈T2 T1≈T2 T1≈T2 T1≈T2 T1≈T2 T1 T2
(odds format) t=3.18 t=−9.75
Note. The scenarios were described in terms of the prior probability of the disease, the true and false positive
rate of each test, the harm caused by treating a patient who does not have the disease, and the cost of neglecting
to treat a patient who does have the disease. In each case, the two tests had equal utility. OED models (Table
A1, see also Nelson, 2005, 2008) of the relative usefulness of each test were calculated. The two lowermost
rows give subjects’ preferences and the t-statistic reported by Baron and Hershey, for cases in which subjects
significantly (uncorrected two-tail p < .05) preferred one of the tests. There are two numbers for each scenario,
reflecting responses from different informational formats. The first version used a percentage (e.g., “75 percent”)
to denote the prior probability that the patient had the disease; the second version used odds (“three to one”) to
describe the probability that the patient had the disease. It does not appear that any of the OED models offer a
plausible explanation of subjects’ choices on this task. Probability gain and information gain wrongly predict that
Test 2 will be preferred in Case 10, and that Test 1 will be preferred in Case 11. Impact predicts a preference in
Cases 8 and 9, which was not observed, and is tied in Case 10 and Case 11, where subjects showed preferences.
Bayesian diagnosticity and log10 diagnosticity show strong preferences in Case 8 and Case 9, whereas subjects
were statistically indistinguishable from indifference. In Case 8 and Case 9, the trend (which Baron and Hershey
reported as nonsignificant in each instance) was for subjects to prefer Test 1 in Case 8, and Test 2 in Case 9. All
the OED models, however, have the opposite preference, namely for Test 2 in Case 8, and Test 1 in Case 9.
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Figure A1: Learning data from Environment 2, Experiments 1 and 2. Each subject is one row; each column is one
feature configuration, sorted according to their frequency from left to right. Trials are plotted from top to bottom, and
from left to right, for a particular subject and a particular configuration. In each trial, a decision that is consistent
with which category is most probable (Experiment 1) or is most rewarded (Experiment 2), is plotted with a white
rectangular pixel. Suboptimal decisions are plotted with black rectangular pixels. The top two panels show learning
data from Experiment 1, in which people’s task was to classify stimuli according to which category is most probable
(i.e., with no explicit reward function during learning). Most people (38/40) achieved the learning criterion. The
bottom two panels show learning data from Experiment 2, in which an explicit asymmetric reward function applied in
the learning phase. Only 19 out of 40 people achieved the learning criterion. The results show that subjects struggled
a great deal with the conflict configuration (second column from left), for which accuracy and reward conflict (i.e.,
subjects had to choose the less likely category in order to maximize expected reward).
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